UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

10-31-2013

State v. Larson Appellant's Brief Dckt. 40091

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Larson Appellant's Brief Dckt. 40091" (2013). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 4907.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4907

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE

IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

)
)
)
)

NO. 40091
BONNER COUNTY NO. CR 2011-1223

)

RICHARD ALLEN LARSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF
FIRST JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF BONNER

HONORABLESTEVEVERBY
District Judge

SARA B. THOMAS
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. #5867
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit
I.S.B. #6247

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-001 O
(208) 334-4534

SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #7353
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100
Boise, ID 83703
(208) 334-2712

ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................. ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ............................................................................... 1
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL ............................................................................... 7
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................... 8
I.

The District Court Erred In Allowing Detective Johnston To Testify
As A Ballistics Expert ........................................................................................... 8
A. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 8
B. Standard Of Review ......................................................................................... 8
C. The District Court Erred In Allowing Detective Johnston To Testify
As A Ballistics Expert ....................................................................................... 9

II. The State Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct ................................................. 11
A. Introduction .................................................................................................... 11
8. Standard Of Review ....................................................................................... 11
C. The Prosecutor Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct In
Closing Arguments ........................................................................................ 11
D. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Rose To The Level Of A
Fundamental Error ......................................................................................... 14
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 17
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .......................................................................................... 18

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570 (Ct. App. 2007) .................................................. 15
State v. Bonaparte, 114 Idaho 577 (Ct. App. 1998) ............................................ 12
State v. Burrow, 142 Idaho 328 (Ct. App. 2005) ................................................... 9
State v. Dudley, 137 Idaho 888 (Ct. App. 2002) ............................................ 12, 13
State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53 (2011) ......................................................... 11, 15
State v. Luke, 134 Idaho 294 (2000) ................................................................... 12
State v. McDougall, 113 Idaho 900 (Ct. App. 1988) ............................................ 12
State v. Me,win, 131 Idaho 642 (1998) ................................................................. 8
State v. Pearce, 146 Idaho 241 (2008) ............................................................. 8, 9
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010) .................................................................. 15
State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82 (Ct. App. 2007) ................................................... 11
State v. Wright, 147 Idaho 150 (Ct. App. 2009) ................................................ 8, 9

Statutes
I.C. § 18-901 ....................................................................................................... 12

Rules
I.R.E. 702 ..........................................................................................................8, 9

Constitutional Provisions
Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution .............................................................. 11
Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution ............ 11

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Richard Larson was convicted, following a jury trial, of two counts of aggravated
assault. On appeal, Mr. Larson contends that the district court erred in allowing the
opinion testimony of Detective Johnston as an expert witness.

Mr. Larson further

contends that the prosecutor improperly misstated the law during closing arguments.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On the evening of February 9, 2011, deputies responded to a report of shots fired
in a semi-remote area in the mountains of northern Idaho. (Presentence Investigation
Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.2.) They spoke to John Bilsky, who reported that he had
shot Richard Larson in the chest, as he believed Mr. Larson was attacking his girlfriend,
Lora Adams. (PSI, p.2.) Mr. Bilsky reported that he and Mr. Larson were both armed
with handguns and both fired shots.

(PSI, p.2.) Mr. Bilsky was uninjured; however,

Mr. Larson was airlifted to Spokane due to the serious nature of his gunshot wounds.
(PSI, p.2.) Mr. Larson was charged with two counts of aggravated assault. (R., pp.1516.) Mr. Bilsky apparently was not charged with any crimes. (Trial Tr., p.408, L.25 p.409, L.9, p.540, L.2 - p.541, L.2.)
The underlying facts of this case go back to the summer of 2010, when
Ms. Adams decided to move from South Carolina to Idaho and began the process of
finding a home in northern Idaho. (Trial Tr., p.180, Ls.17-18, p.181, Ls.1-12, p.658, L.6
- p.659, L.23.) Ms. Adams and Mr. Larson first met when Ms. Adams was shown a
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house on the property adjoining Mr. Larson's property by her realtor. 1 (Trial Tr., p.182,
L.7 - p.183, L.12, p.224, Ls.23-25; PSI, p.3.) They immediately hit it off, and after
Ms. Adams began the process to purchase the house, the two quickly became close

and began dating. (Trial Tr., p.183, Ls.4-5, p.185, Ls.10-23; PSI, p.3.) Ms. Adams even
moved into Mr. Larson's home and lived with him for about three or four weeks before
she closed on her house. (Trial Tr., p.185, L.21 - p.186, L.4, p.278, Ls.1-3, p.659, Ls.115; PSI, p.3.) At the end of July 2010, Ms. Adams' house was ready, and she moved

out of Mr. Larson's house and broke up with him a couple months later.

(Trial

Tr., p.186, L.5 - p.187, L.25, p.659, L.17 - p.666, L.19; PSI, p.3.) Ms. Adams began an
online relationship with another man, Mr. Bilsky, who had come to visit her in December
of 2010 and who was still living with her in February of 2011. (Trial Tr., p.195, L.20 p.197, L.18; PSI, p.3.)
Mr. Larson typically carried a pistol with him, due to the abundance of wildlife in
the woods near his home, such as bear and moose. 2 (Trial Tr., p.653, L.20 - p.655,
L.16.) For recreation, Mr. Larson regularly shot at targets and had a shooting range on
his property. (Trial Tr., p.649, Ls.9-12, p.650, L.5 - p.651, L.21; p.655, L.17 - p.656,
L.11.)
Approximately a month prior to this incident, Mr. Larson had strung two gates
made of cable across the road by his house, to keep unwanted people from driving up
the private road. (Trial Tr., p.199, Ls.7-10, p.201, Ls.4-6, p.664, L.5 - p.665, L.7; PSI,
p.3.) He tied flagging to both gates, to increase visibility for snowmobile drivers. (Trial

Ms. Adams' house was approximately 300 feet away from Mr. Larson's house. (Trial
Tr., p.184, Ls.21-23.)
2 Mr. Larson's and Ms. Adams' homes were located in a semi-remote wooded area
approximately seven miles up a winding gravel road. (Trial Tr., p.183, Ls.15-16, p.195,
Ls.2-4.)
1
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Tr., p.670, Ls.5-15; PSI, p.3.) Ms. Adams had to drive through these gates in order to
access her property. (Trial Tr., p.207, Ls.12-19, p.266, L.12; PSI, p.3.)
On the date of the incident, Mr. Larson had noticed that the flagging tied to the
lower gate had been torn off so, after replacing the flagging, he drove his ATV back to
the lower gate at the approximate time Ms. Adams typically arrived home so that he
could speak with her and ask that she stop tearing the flagging off of the gates. (Trial
Tr., p.670, L.5 - p.671, L.7, p.674, Ls.6-15; PSI, p.3.)

Mr. Larson was armed with his

pistol, as he had just seen a moose in his yard and had observed fresh moose tracks by
the gate. (Trial Tr., p.676, L.23 - p.677, L.4.) Mr. Larson testified that after Ms. Adams
arrived at the gate, she stepped out of her vehicle and opened the gate.

(Trial

Tr., p.678, L.25 - p.679, L.4.) As Ms. Adams was getting back into her car to drive
through the gate, Mr. Larson approached her vehicle, and as he approached, he slipped
on the ice and fell against her car door, accidentally catching her hand in the car door.
(Trial Tr., p.678, L.5 - p.679, L.8; PSI, p.3.) Mr. Larson testified that he apologized, but
that Ms. Adams became enraged, and began hitting him and kneeing him in the groin.
(Trial Tr., p.679, Ls.8-16; PSI, p.3.)

After repeatedly being struck by Ms. Adams,

Mr. Larson grabbed her and struck her, knocking her down into a snowbank.

(Trial

Tr., p.679, Ls.18-20.) Around that time, Mr. Bilsky showed up and shot Mr. Larson twice
in the chest with his gun.

(Trial Tr., p.679, L.24 - p.680, L. 18; PSI, p.4.)

After

Mr. Larson was shot, he drew his gun with difficulty, and emptied his weapon pell-mell. 3
(Trial Tr., p.680, L.9 - p.681, L.5; PSI, p.4.) Mr. Larson testified that he was not aiming
at any particular target, but was acting instinctively. (Trial Tr., p.680, L.22 - p.681, L.5.)

Mr. Larson was wearing thick, waterproof ski gloves and testified that his fingers were
jammed into the trigger area of the gun. (Trial Tr., p.674, L.23 - 675, L.6.)
3

3

Notably, despite all of the target practice Mr. Larson regularly engaged in, he did not hit
either Mr. Bilsky or Ms. Adams.
Ms. Adams' description of the incident differed from Mr. Larson's description.
She explained that she and Mr. Bilsky typically communicated via walkie-talkie and had
calculated the length of time it took her to reach her driveway from the lower cable gate
(72 seconds). (Trial Tr., p.210, Ls.13-18, p.321, L.16 - p.324, L.4.) She testified that,
on February 9, 2011, when she pulled up to the gate and got out of her vehicle to open
the gate, Mr. Larson was there on his ATV, and he began calling her names.

(Trial

Tr., p.213, L.1 - p.216, L.3.) He yelled at her, then followed her back to her vehicle and
then intentionally shut her hand in her car door. (Trial Tr., p.213, L.19 - p.216, L.15.)
She then kneed him in the groin. (Trial Tr., p.216, Ls.7-8.) Mr. Larson then punched
her in the side of the head and ear several times and then pushed her into a snow bank.
(Trial Tr., p.216, Ls.18-20, p.217, Ls.1-16, p.231, Ls.12-24.) Mr. Larson straddled her in
the snow, and then he drew his gun and held it to her face. (Trial Tr., p.231, L.25 p.233, L.22.) Ms. Adams testified that Mr. Larson then put his hands around her neck
and began to squeeze.

(Trial Tr., p.235, Ls.7-14.)

She testified that he verbally

threatened to kill her, and, when Mr. Bilsky arrived at the vehicle, he threatened to kill
Mr. Bilsky. (Trial Tr., p.232, Ls.24-25, p.233, Ls.18-19, p.234, Ls.10-12, p.235, L.10,
p.242, Ls.21-22.)
Ms. Adams testified that Mr. Larson shot first, and that he shot three or four times
in the direction of Mr. Bilsky soon after Mr. Bilsky arrived at the gate to check on
Ms. Adams. (Trial Tr., p.243, Ls.7-23, p.244, Ls.3-10.) Ms. Adams then heard two or
three shots from Mr. Bilsky's direction and Mr. Larson turned towards her and said "I'm
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shot. I'm shot. He hit me in the chest." (Trial Tr., p.245, L.23 - p.246, L.3.) Mr. Larson
then turned and started to walk back toward his house. (Trial Tr., p.246, Ls.10-16.)
According to Mr. Bilsky, when Ms. Adams did not arrive at the house for three to
four minutes after her last communication with Mr. Bilsky and did not respond when he
called for her on the walkie-talkie, he put on his holster containing his gun and walked
down the driveway. (Trial Tr., p.324, L.9 - p.326, L.2.) He saw Ms. Adams' vehicle and
Mr. Larson's ATV.

(Trial Tr., p.333, Ls.10-13.)

He testified that he called for

Ms. Adams, and, as he came up to Ms. Adams' vehicle, he saw Mr. Larson stand up
with his gun pointed at Mr. Bilsky.

(Trial Tr., p.335, Ls.16-19, p.336, Ls.15-21.)

Mr. Bilsky testified that Mr. Larson told him to leave and threatened to kill him. (Trial
Tr., p.337, Ls.20-22.) As Mr. Bilsky was backing away from the vehicle with his gun in
his hand, he saw Ms. Adams in the snow and asked her if she was okay.

(Trial

Tr., p.337, L.24 - p.339, L.6.) After Ms. Adams responded "yes," Mr. Larson yelled "no"
or "go" then Mr. Larson started shooting at Mr. Bilsky.

(Trial Tr. p.339, Ls.4-9.)

Mr. Bilsky returned fire with two shots, at least one of which struck Mr. Larson in the
chest. (Trial Tr., p.341, L.4, p.341, Ls.18-21, p.342, Ls.3-18.)
At the jury trial in this case, the State presented the testimony of several
witnesses, including the testimony of Detective Gary Johnston, who was one of the
sheriff's deputies investigating the shooting. (Trial Tr., p.518, L.17 - p.547, L.5.) Over
the ongoing objections of Mr. Larson's counsel, Detective Johnston testified as an
expert witness as to the directionality of the bullet that passed through Ms. Adams'
driver's side rear view mirror. (Trial Tr., p.523, L.9 - p.539, L.3.)

5

Mr. Larson testified at trial that he acted in self-defense, as Mr. Bilsky shot him
first, after which he emptied his gun pell-mell, without aiming at any one thing in
particular. (Trial Tr., p.679, L.24 - p.681, L.5.)
The jury convicted Mr. Larson of two counts of aggravated assault. (Trial
Tr., p.826, Ls.1-15; R., p.126.)
The district court ordered a PSI and an evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522,
and it set the matter for a sentencing hearing.

(Trial Tr., p.831, L.24 - p. 832, L.6;

R., pp.124, 161.)
Mr. Larson was sentenced on May 22, 2012.

(See generally 5/22/12 Tr.;

R., pp.164-166, 170-173.) Mr. Larson offered significant evidence in mitigation including
over a dozen letters from supportive co-workers, former supervisors and friends. (PSI,
pp. 73-99.) The district court sentenced Mr. Larson to two consecutive sentences of five
years, with two years fixed, for each count of aggravated assault.

(5/22/12 Tr., p.31,

Ls.11-15; R., p.172.)
Mr. Larson timely appealed from his judgment of conviction.
200-204.)
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(R., pp.175-177,

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err in allowing the opinion testimony of Detective Johnston
as an expert witness as to the science of ballistics?

2.

Did the State commit prosecutorial misconduct?

7

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred In Allowing Detective Johnston To Testify As A Ballistics Expert

A.

Introduction
At issue in this case is whether Mr. Larson shot first at Mr. Bilsky or whether he

merely shot pell-mell after being hit in the chest by two rounds from Mr. Bilsky's gun.
Because the encounter occurred around Ms. Adams' vehicle-Mr. Bilsky and
Mr. Larson allegedly stalked each other, circling the vehicle-the directionality of the
bullet that went through Ms. Adams' vehicle's side mirror was an issue during the trial.
Although trial counsel objected to his qualifications as an expert, Detective Johnston
was permitted to testify as to the directionality of the bullet through Ms. Adams' window.

B.

Standard Of Review
The admission of expert testimony is governed by Idaho Rule of Evidence 702,

which provides that testimony of qualified expert witnesses may be admitted if
"scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue .... " The admissibility of expert
testimony is discretionary with the trial court and a decision will not be disturbed on
appeal absent an abuse of discretion.

State v. Pearce, 146 Idaho 241, 245 (2008);

State v. Wright, 147 Idaho 150, 155 (Ct. App. 2009); State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642,
647 (1998).

When determining whether the district court abused its discretion, this

Court considers: (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and
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consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the
court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Wright, 147 Idaho at 155.

C.

The District Court Erred In Allowing Detective Johnston To Testify As A Ballistics
Expert
The State's witness, Detective Johnston, was permitted, over the continuous

objection of defense counsel, to testify as an expert witness.

The State elicited

technical ballistics information regarding the directionality of the bullet that traveled
through Ms. Adams' side mirror from Detective Johnston. Such was error.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
A qualified expert is one who possesses "knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education" in the field at issue. 1.R.E. 702. The proponent of the testimony must lay
foundational evidence which demonstrates that the individual is qualified as an expert
on the topic of his testimony. State v. Burrow, 142 Idaho 328, 330 (Ct. App. 2005). In
State

v. Pearce, 146 Idaho 241 (2008), the Idaho Supreme Court explained:
To give expert testimony, a witness must first be qualified as an expert on
the matter at hand. Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 is the appropriate test for
measuring the reliability of evidence for expert testimony. "If scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience or specialized
knowledge may testify thereto in the form of opinion or otherwise."
Otherwise stated, the rule provides that qualified experts may testify in the
form of an opinion only if their specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue. There must
be some demonstration that the witness has acquired, through some
type of training, education or experience, the necessary expertise and
knowledge to render the proffered opinion.

Pearce, 146 Idaho at 245-246 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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Here, Detective Johnston testified that he only had "[v]ery general training" with
regard to ballistics, bullet travel and investigations relating to bullets. (Trial Tr., p.524,
L.25 - p.424, L.3.) Although the witness explained to the jury the basic principles of
bullet travel, there was no information as to what classes or courses he took to glean
this information. (Trial Tr., p.526, Ls.5-22, p.527, L.19 - p.529, L.2.) While he guessed
that he may have been involved in "probably between 50 to 100" investigations which
required a determination as to which direction a bullet had entered and exited an object,
the witness never testified that he was the person responsible for ascertaining bullet
directionality in any of these investigations. (Trial Tr., p.525, Ls.11-20.) Further, he
testified only that he had "reviewed that kind of evidence [to determine direction of a
projectile]."

(Trial Tr., p.529, Ls.20-23 (emphasis added).)

Additionally, while he

testified that he may have "assisted" other people, including underlings, in determining
directionality of projectiles, at no point did he state that he trains others on such
determinations. (Trial Tr., p.529, L.24 - p.530, L.6.)
Defense counsel objected continuously to the qualification of Detective Johnston
as an expert witness. 4 (Trial Tr., p.523, Ls.12-16, p.526, Ls.1-2, p.527, Ls.6-7, p.530,
Ls.14-15, p.537, Ls.2-8.) Although the district court initially sustained the first objection
for lack of foundation, the court later found that Detective Johnston was qualified to

4 Defense

counsel objected numerous times to Detective Johnston being qualified as a
ballistics expert:
I continue my objection. This information's coming in drip by drip and the
opinions are sliding in. Even though ballistics is a science and he's not
trained as a ballistics specialist, he's making opinions that in many
courtrooms are considered scientific opinions.

(Trial Tr., p.537, Ls.2-8.)
10

testify as an expert witness as to the directionality of the bullet. (Trial Tr., p.523, Ls.1423, p.535, Ls.14-17.)
In allowing Detective Johnston to testify as an expert witness on ballistics, the
district court erred.

11.
The State Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct

A

Introduction
Mr. Larson asserts that his right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Fifth and the

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 13 of the
Idaho Constitution, was violated when the prosecutor misrepresented the law during
closing arguments. Mr. Larson asserts that the prosecutor's closing arguments lowered
the State's burden of proof, which requires reversal of his conviction.

B.

Standard Of Review
It is prosecutorial misconduct for a prosecutor to misstate the law in closing

arguments. State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007).
Here, Mr. Larson contemporaneously objected to the prosecutor's comments.
Should this Court find that Mr. Larson's objections were not sufficiently specific,
Mr. Larson contends that the prosecutor's statements rose to the level of a fundamental
error.

C.

The Prosecutor Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct In Closing Arguments
Mr. Larson asserts that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct

during his closing argument by misstating the law.
ultimately reduced the State's burden of proof.
11

The misstatement of the law

Mr. Larson was charged with the aggravated assault of Ms. Adams and
Mr. Bilsky under subsection (b) of I.C. § 18-901 which describes assault as:
b) an intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the
person of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and doing
some act which creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such
violence is imminent.
I.C. § 18-901 (b) (emphasis added).
This offense requires an "intentional" threat by word or act. With respect to the
"threat" type of assault proscribed by I. C. § 18-901 (b ), the Idaho Court of Appeals has
held that the offense requires an intent to make a threat, by word or act, to do violence
to another. State v. Dudley, 137 Idaho 888, 890-91 (Ct. App. 2002).
As for Mr. Bilsky, Mr. Larson was charged with both the "threat" type of assault
found in I.C. § 18-901 (b), and also with the "attempt" type of assault proscribed by
I.C. § 18-901 (a) for his actions regarding Mr. Bilsky. (R., pp.49-50.) However, attempt
crimes require a specific showing of the intent to commit the underlying crime. State v.

Luke, 134 Idaho 294, 300 (2000). Therefore, "the intent for an assault with a deadly
weapon is the intent to attempt to commit a battery." State v. Bonaparte, 114 Idaho
577, 580 (Ct. App. 1998) (citation omitted). Therefore, Mr. Larson must have intended
to attempt to commit a battery on Mr. Bilskey, and the lack of this intent would be a
defense. 5
Here, the State charged Mr. Larson with the "threat" form of assault under
subsection (b) for his acts involving Ms. Adams and under both subsection (a) and

5

Mr. Larson testified at trial that he did not draw his weapon until after Mr. Bilsky shot
him, and even then, that he fired his weapon "pell-mell," meaning he was not aiming at
any particular target, but was acting instinctively. (Trial Tr., p.680, L.9 - p.681, L.5.)
12

subsection (b) for his acts involving Mr. Bilsky. 6 (R., pp.49-50.) Therefore, it was the
State's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Larson intended to threaten
Ms. Adams and Mr. Bilsky and/or intended to commit a battery on Mr. Bilsky.

See

Dudley, 137 Idaho at 890-91.

The prosecutor began his closing statement to the jury by saying:
Thank you, your Honor. Preliminarily, I do want to draw your attention to
Jury Instruction 13 as it is not a model of clarity. It states: "In every crime
or public offense there must exist a union or joint operation of act and
intent." I submit that the word "intent" in this context does not mean the
intent to commit a crime.
(Trial Tr., p.795, L.16-23.)
Defense counsel objected to the State's explanation of the jury instructions.
(Trial Tr., p.795, L.24 - p.797, L.3.) The district court overruled the objections, finding
that it was permissible argument by the prosecutor.

(Trial Tr., p.796, Ls.7-8, p.797,

Ls.4-5.) The State went on to tell the jury:
PROSECUTOR: What that jury instruction speaks to is you don't have to
have the intent to commit the crime itself; you have the intent to commit
the interdicted act. That is, you don't have to have the intent to commit
the crime of aggravated assault; you have to have the intent to point and
point the weapon, use DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection, again.
THE PROSECUTOR: -- so in an assaultive manner DEFENSE COUNSEL: He is explaining and defining what that means, sir.
THE COURT: I'm going to allow this as argument.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Thank you, sir.

While Mr. Larson was charged only with violating subsection (b) of the assault statute
for his actions involving Ms. Adams, Mr. Larson was charged under both subsections,
(a) and (b), for his actions relating to Mr. Bilsky. (R., pp.49-50.)

6
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THE PROSECUTOR: So not unlike a DUI, to put it in context, you don't
have to have the intent to drive while under the influence of alcohol; you
simply have to have the intent to drive the automobile. That's what that
instruction means.
(Trial Tr., p.796, L.16- p.797, L.12.)
Where the State argued that Mr. Larson only had to intend to point the weapon
and that he did not have to intend to threaten Ms. Adams or Mr. Bilsky, the State was
ultimately telling the jury that the act need only be willful, and Mr. Larson could be
convicted without having intended the threat or having intended to commit a battery.
The prosecutor further misinformed the jury by likening the intent required to prove
aggravated assault to the willful standard utilized in a DUI case.

The prosecutor's

argument lowered the State's burden of proof and left the jury with the impression that it
could convict Mr. Larson even if it found that he did not intend to make a threat or
commit a battery.
Mr. Larson, several times, objected to the State's explanation of the meaning of
"intent," but the district court allowed the State to argue the incorrect standard, and
allowed the State to argue that it did not have to prove that Mr. Larson intended any
threat or injury.

Thus the jurors could reasonably have concluded that they were

directed by the prosecutor to find Mr. Larson guilty of aggravated assault without finding
that he intended to threaten Ms. Adams or Mr. Bilsky and without finding that he
intended to commit a battery on Mr. Bilsky.

D.

Alternatively 1 The
Fundamental Error

Prosecutorial

Misconduct Rose To The

Level Of A

Alternatively, should this Court find that Mr. Larson's objections were not
sufficiently specific, Mr. Larson can show that the claim raised is one of fundamental
error.

The Idaho Supreme Court has set forth the standard of appellate review of
14

unobjected-to error. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). Pursuant to Perry, a
defendant must demonstrate that: 1) one or more of his unwaived constitutional rights
were violated; 2) there was a clear and obvious error without the need for additional
information not contained in the appellate record; and 3) the error affected the
defendant's substantial rights, meaning that there is a reasonable probability that the
error affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. Id. at 226. Mr. Larson meets all the
prongs of this test.
First, the alleged error is a violation of Mr. Larson's right to due process and a fair
trial.

Mr. Larson was charged with two counts of aggravated assault. (R., pp.49-50.)

However, the general elements instruction told the jury that "[a]n 'assault' is committed
when a person ... intentionally and unlawfully threatens by word or act to do violence to
the person of another, with an apparent ability to do so, and does some act which
creates a well-founded fear in the other person that such violence is imminent," (Jury
Instruction No. 14), but the prosecutor, in his closing remarks, incorrectly told the jury
that the intent it needed to find was the "willful" standard analogous to the DUI statute,
thus removing the State's burden to prove that Mr. Larson intentionally threatened
Ms. Adams and Mr. Bilsky and intended to commit a battery on Mr. Bilsky. Thus, giving
this instruction violated Mr. Larson's right to a fair trial and due process.
"Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law
as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted at trial, including
reasonable inferences from that evidence, this impacts a defendant's Fourteenth
Amendment right to a fair trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. The prosecutor's statement
misinformed the jury as to the State's burden of proof as to Mr. Larson's intent, which
was a violation of Mr. Larson's right to due process.
15

See a/so State v. Beebe, 145

Idaho 570 (Ct. App. 2007) (finding prosecutorial misconduct rising to the level of a
fundamental error where the prosecutor misstated the evidence, misstated the law, and
appealed to the passions and prejudice of the jury).
Thus the jurors could reasonably have concluded that they were directed to find
Mr. Larson guilty of aggravated assault without finding that he intended to make a threat
or commit a battery. Such an interpretation would have deprived Mr. Larson of his right
to the due process of law and his right to a fair trial; thus, the instructions in this case
were unconstitutional.

Thus, the error implicates one of Mr. Larson's unwaived

constitutional rights.
Second, the error is clear and obvious from the record. These fair trial and due
process violations are apparent from the face of the record and are clear violations of
well-established law.

The closing statements of the prosecutor are in the record, so

there is no need for additional information outside the record.

Further, trial counsel

strenuously objected to the State's definition of the "intent" required to find Mr. Larson
guilty. (Trial Tr., p.795, L.17 - p.797, L.6.)
Third, there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings. While the jury did receive an instruction properly setting forth the general
elements of assault (Jury Instruction No. 14; Trial Tr., p.784, Ls.9-17), the jury was
erroneously instructed as to the meaning of "intent."

(Trial Tr., p.795, L.16 - p.797,

L.12.) However, because of the error, the jury was left with the impression that it could
convict Mr. Larson even if it found that he did not intend to threaten or to commit a
battery.
It was apparent from the prosecutor's misstatement of the law that the jury could
convict Mr. Larson without the requisite finding of intent. This removed the burden on
16

the State to prove that Mr. Larson intended to threaten Ms. Adams and Mr. Bilsky and
commit a battery on Mr. Bilsky.
Because the prosecutor's explanation of intent violated Mr. Larson's right to due
process and a fair trial, and because he meets all three prongs of Idaho's fundamental
error test, Mr. Larson's conviction must be vacated.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Larson respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and remand
his case for a new trial.
DATED this 31st day of October, 2013.

SALLY J. COO Y
\j
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
},
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